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Abstract 
The development of information systems and the Internet has facilitated the creation of an online 
platform where two or more groups are involved and interact online with each other. We explore the 
impact of an online platform on human behavior and human perception. There are various online 
markets. We focus on  two markets: the online P2P market, and the e-book market.  
This paper includes three essays: ‘Herding behavior in online P2P lending: An empirical 
investigation’, ‘Does borrowers’ information renewal change lenders’ decision in P2P lending? An 
empirical investigation’, and ‘Dynamics of price elasticity over time: Evidence from the e-book 
industry’. Since the first essay was published in the journal and the third one was submitted to the 
conference, we simply present the abstracts of these essays in this paper. Also, we mainly focus on 
explaining the current stage and plans for completion of the second paper. 
Although this paper is not yet completed, we empirically confirm some characteristics of the online 
markets. We expect that it would be useful to understand online business and get insights into the 
online markets.  
Keywords: online platform, P2P lending, e-book, herding, price elasticity. 
1 INTRODUCTOIN 
Advances in information technology (IT) have made it possible to interact, communicate, and transact 
online. Online shopping, online banking, and online social networking services came into common use  
a few years ago. Development of information technology has also made the transition from physical to 
digital products possible. Although consumers still use traditional goods like CD(compact disc) and 
paper books, the market of digital goods such as music file and e-books has been growing rapidly. 
Among these relatively new markets that advances in technology have allowed, we focus on two 
online markets. One is the online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending market, and the other is the electronic 
book (e-book) market. These two markets are a kind of online platform where two or more groups of 
agents interact with each other. We explore how an online platform impacts on customer’s behavior 
and perceptions.  
This research paper is comprised of three essays. The first one is to investigate lenders’ behaviour in 
an online P2P lending market. The second essay deals with learning mechanisms of borrowers and 
lenders in the market. In the last essay, we investigate changes in consumers’ perception of price in the 
e-book market. The titles of each essay are as follows:  
 Herding behavior in online P2P lending: An empirical investigation. 
 Does borrowers’ information renewal change lenders’ decision in P2P lending? An empirical 
investigation.  
 Dynamics of price elasticity over time: Evidence from the e-book industry. 
The first essay was completed and published last year in the leading journal Electronic Commerce 
Research and Applications. Also, we finished the first draft of the third essay, and submitted to PACIS 
2013 as a complete paper. We, however, are still working on the second essay. Therefore, in this paper 
which is research in progress, we decided to just report the abstracts of the first and third essay, and 
mainly present the research topic, main idea, the current stage, and plans for completion of the second 
essay.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the abstract of the first essay, 
‘Herding behavior in online p2p lending: An empirical investigation’. Section 3 shows the current 
progress including plans for completion of the second essay, ‘Does borrowers’ information renewal 
change lenders’ decision in p2p lending? An empirical investigation’. Section 4 describes the abstract 
of the third essay, ‘Dynamics of price elasticity over time: Evidence from the e-book industry’. We 
conclude the paper by summarizing and mentioning future work in section 5.  
2 HERDING BEHAVIOR IN ONLINE P2P LENDING: AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
1
 
We study lenders’ behavior in the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market, where individuals bid on 
unsecured microloans requested by other individual borrowers. Online P2P exchanges are growing, 
but lenders in this market are not professional investors. In addition, lenders have to take big risks 
because loans in P2P lending are granted without collateral. While the P2P lending market shares 
some characteristics of the online markets with herding behavior, it also has characteristics that may 
discourage it. This essay empirically investigates herding behavior in the P2P lending market where 
seemingly conflicting conditions and features of herding are present. Using a large sample of daily 
data from one of the largest P2P lending platforms in Korea, we found strong evidence of herding and 
its diminishing marginal effect as bidding advances. We employ a multinomial logit market-share 
model where relevant variables verified by prior studies on P2P lending are controlled. 
                                              
1 This essay is published in the leading journal Electronic Commerce Research and Applications.  
3 DOES BORROWERS’ INFORMATION RENEWAL CHANGE 
LENDERS’ DECISION IN P2P LENDING? AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION 
3.1 Introduction 
Online Peer-to-Peer lending (P2P lending) is a financial service where borrowers and lenders directly 
transact without intermediaries.  This new trend of financial transaction has rapidly grown after Zopa 
(http://www.zopa.com), the first P2P lending site, was launched in 2005 in the UK. Prosper 
(http://www.prosper.com) is the largest P2P lending platform operating in the US. It has over a million 
members and it has funded a sum of over $300 million in personal loans as of February 2012.  
According to Slavin (2007), P2P online exchange is growing in the US and the UK as an alternative 
platform of traditional saving and investment. Also in Europe and Asia, many P2P lending sites 
opened their services to the public and are now in operation. Popfunding (http://popfunding.com) is 
one of the largest P2P lending platforms in South Korea. Most of these sites have similar bidding 
mechanisms and features.  
P2P lending is attractive for borrowers because they have a chance to gain loans with lower rates in 
some cases even without collateral. Lenders also have an incentive to participate in this market. Since 
transaction costs are reduced by eliminating expensive intermediaries, a higher rate of return on 
investment than from a bank is usually expected. However, there exists an inherent risk in P2P lending, 
due to the anonymous nature of the Internet and a lack of lenders’ expertise. In other words, the 
transaction takes place in a pseudonymous online environment and most individual lenders in P2P 
lending are not professional investors (Klafft 2008), which causes serious information asymmetry 
problems. Default rates and loan frauds would also be of concern to participants in P2P lending (Wang 
et al. 2009). Therefore, the P2P lending sites put a lot of effort into alleviating information asymmetry. 
There are small differences between the sites, but most P2P lending sites ask the borrower to submit a 
basic personal certification in order to verify their creditworthiness.  Also, the P2P lending platforms 
enable their members to communicate and share knowledge - social networks - so that lenders are able 
to utilize soft information (Iyer et al. 2009). Many researchers who study P2P lending, focus on these 
social networks (Freedman & Jin 2011; Herrero-Lopez 2009; Lin et al. 2009), and have shown that 
social networks play a role in mitigating information asymmetries. 
Although these efforts work on some level, this asymmetric information problem still remains in the 
P2P lending market. For this reason, lenders hesitate to invest in an auction; consequently many 
auctions do not receive full funds. Borrowers who failed once may try again to get a loan According to 
Popfunding data from July 2007 to May 2010, a total of 1,883 number of auctions  were opened by 
borrowers during this period, and among these, 1,028 auctions were not the first ones which the 
borrowers posted, which are henceforth called ‘retried auctions’. It means that lots of borrowers 
request a loan again after their initial failures. Among the entire loans, 338 loan requests were 
successfully funded (18%). Among these fully funded loans, 220 auctions were retried ones (65%), 
which is a considerably high proportion. It indicates that borrowers in P2P lending tend to change 
some of their information after a failure before they try again to get a loan, and that these changes have 
an impact on the lenders’ choices. In this essay, we identify what information is updated by the 
borrowers in retried auctions and show how this change has an impact on lenders’ decision. 
Despite P2P  short lending history, a lot of researchers have studied this market. Most of them focus 
on the role of social networks and other factors that affect the likelihood of funding success in the P2P 
lending market. However, as far as we know no research of information update after a failure has ever 
been explored. This essay may help borrowers and lenders to develop a strategy that is profitable for 
both sides by showing dynamic information changes that are done by borrowers and the impact of 
such changes.  
3.2 Literature Review 
Although the history of online P2P lending is relatively short, there are various studies on online P2P 
lending. Since one of the most primary features of P2P lending is its reliance on existing social 
networks, many previous researchers focus on it. Social networks, especially their relational aspects, 
lead to better outcomes including a higher likelihood of a loan being funded, a lower risk of default, 
and lower interest rates (Lin et al. 2009). Lin et al. (2009) use the data from Prosper and show that 
social networks as a new source of soft information can partially solve a problem of adverse selection 
which is severe in online P2P lending. The influences of social interactions on Prosper were also 
evaluated (Herrero-Lopez 2009). It empirically proves that affiliation with Trusted Groups on Prosper 
doubles the probability of getting a loan request successfully funded. However, not all researchers 
agree on the positive effects of social networks in the P2P lending market. Weiss et al. (2010) find that 
although the screening of potential borrowers by groups can mitigate adverse selection, groups could 
have a negative impact on a borrower’s probability of receiving the requested funds. That is because 
lenders who are not in the group might be discouraged from lending to a group member due to this 
specific group’s focus on certain special interests. It is also presented that being a member of a social 
lending group within an online lending community is associated with significantly decreased default 
risk only if this membership holds the possibility of real-life personal connections (Everett 2008).  
Other factors affecting success in online P2P lending are also studied by many researchers. The 
financial strength of the borrower, of course, is an important determinant of funding success 
(Herzenstein et al. 2008; Iyer et al. 2009). The world’s largest P2P lending platform, Prosper assigns 
each borrower a credit grade based on their financial documents, and this credit score varies from AA 
- signifying that the borrower has definitely low risk to A, B, C, D, E, and finally HR which denotes 
the borrower’s risk as extremely high. The probability of funding success by borrowers with AA, or A 
is nearly 40%, in contrast to borrowers with HR whose rate is only 4% (Herzenstein et al. 2008). This 
credit score assigned to borrowers by Prosper is indeed related to underlying creditworthiness (Iyer et 
al. 2009). The demographic characteristics of the borrowers have an influence on the decision of the 
lenders. According to Pope and Sydnor (2008), there is evidence of racial disparity. Blacks tend to be 
less likely to receive funding and have conditional higher interest rates on receiving a loan compared 
to non-black people. Loan decision variables such as loan amounts, interest rates, and loan terms play 
a role as a mediator between borrower characteristics and the likelihood of funding success 
(Herzenstein et al. 2008). When the borrowers in P2P lending post a loan request, they write a detailed 
description of the purpose of the loan and a plan for repayment. Choi and Park (2011) analyze the 
impact of the expression that borrowers use in their writings on loan repayment with Prosper data. The 
expressions that emotionally appeal to lenders have a negative relation with repayment performance, 
and the expressions that describe the borrower’s ability to regularly repay their debts are positively 
related with actual repayment performances.      
As we mentioned in the previous section, many borrowers re-post their auctions after initial failures. 
There are, however, few studies which focus on the past transaction history of borrowers in P2P 
lending. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one research, Yum and Lee (2011), which tries to 
consider past transaction history as a factor for reducing the uncertainty of loans and observes the loan 
outcome in situations where lenders are faced with borrowers who have a funded history. The fact that 
past activities of the borrowers are considered, lies in the same context as our research. However, 
while Yum and Lee (2011) consider the past transaction history as one of borrowers’ features, we 
focus more on the dynamic changes of information between a first-tried auction and a retried auction.  
Complementing all these studies, we empirically investigate borrowers’ information renewal and its 
impact on lenders’ decision in the P2P lending market.  
3.3 Development of Hypotheses 
3.3.1 Research Context 
Popfunding is a representative P2P lending platform in South Korea. It opened in June 2007, and as of 
February 28, 2011, it had 55,060 members and a total of 12,927 requested loans. Among them, 1,099 
loans were successfully funded. Popfunding has a similar borrowing and lending process as other P2P 
lending sites like Prosper and Zopa. It applies a reverse auction mechanism as others similar sites do. 
The overall process of borrowing and lending in Popfunding is as follows.  
To request a loan, borrowers have to join Popfunding, and anyone with the age of 20 or above can join 
as a member once a real name authentication. Then borrowers can post loan requests on Popfunding 
with details of the loan such as request amount, loan term and maximum interest rate. In this process, 
borrowers can submit their personal profiles which may include information such as identification 
certificates, credit, address, job, income and tax to the Popfunding platform operators in order to prove 
their creditworthiness and authenticity. Submitted certificates are not publicly opened to lenders, but 
lenders can ascertain whether a certification is submitted or not. If a funded borrower’s payment is 
delayed for more than 10 days, the borrower’s financial status such as credit grades, debt history and 
monthly income is revealed to the lender. Also, borrowers additionally post detailed descriptions of 
the purpose of their loans and repayment plans, and may also emotionally appeal to lenders by 
describing their urgent situation. If borrowers have a history in borrowing or lending it is recorded and 
shown with other information. 
After borrowers post an auction according to the above explained procedures, it is opened to lenders. 
They review the information to decide whether to lend or not; if so, how much money and what 
interest rate they are willing to offer. Since Popfunding provides a Q&A web bulletin for each auction, 
lenders have a chance to gain additional information by interacting with borrowers there. All P2P 
lending communities including Popfunding and Prosper operate on the principle of “full financing,” 
which means that the loan request gets funded only if it receives enough bids to cover the entire 
amount requested by the borrower. If an auction fails to get enough money, it is automatically 
cancelled by the system after the auction duration expires. The borrowers who get successfully funded 
receive the money, and repay it as they posted. 
Due to the information asymmetry problem, the success probability by borrowers to receive full 
funding tends to be quite low. Thus, borrowers who once failed often tend to repost a loan request in 
Popfunding. When they try again to get a loan, borrowers need to make some differences in their 
auction. Otherwise, they would fail again. In this essay, we examine what specific information is 
modified in such retried auctions, and how these changes affect the decision making progress of the 
lenders.  
3.3.2 Research Hypotheses 
P2P lending sites generally nudge borrowers to optionally fill up some information in order to receive 
successful investments from lenders. Considering the fact that P2P lending is based on financial 
transactions between individuals, P2P lending sites usually recommend borrowers to provide certain 
types of certification which may substantiate their financial credibility to the lenders. In the case of 
Popfunding.com, borrowers can selectively submit seven types of certifications such as credit scores 
and income statements to show their financial credibility. Additionally, historical records of financial 
transactions of the borrower in P2P lending sites can be also used as backup data to represent one’s 
financial credibility. 
Generally, previous researches showed that borrowers with higher financial credibility have a higher 
probability of getting investments from lenders. However, our research focus lies on retrials of the 
borrowers after they failed in their initial P2P lending auctions. We assume that a borrower who 
initially fails will not re-post the loan request unless he/she backs up his/her information that may 
increase his/her financial credibility. According to this argument, our research suggests the following 
hypothesis:  
H1-1: When borrowers repost an initially failed P2P lending auction, they try to significantly improve 
their financial credibility to acquire investments. 
One of the unique features in P2P lending mechanism is that there exists not only financial activities, 
but also social network activities between members (lenders and borrowers). In traditional financial 
institutions (such as banking systems), the main agent of loan decisions is the institution itself. 
However, in P2P lending, loan decisions come from a group of individuals in a P2P lending network. 
In addition to financial activities, these members (bong lenders and borrowers) are sharing information 
and forming social relationships with each other. Under this context, not only financial credibility but 
also a certain reputation in the social network is critically important for acquiring investments from 
lenders. The importance of a social network context in P2P lending has been highlighted before, but 
our analysis focuses on the borrowers’ efforts to increase their reputations after they failed in their first 
auctions.  
There are several ways to increase reputations in P2P lending networks. Similar to other internet 
communities, members can post on bulletin boards in P2P lending sites. Our research defines a 
borrower’s reputation in a social network as social credibility and suggests a similar hypothesis with 
the one associated with financial credibility:  
H1-2: When borrowers repost an initially failed P2P lending auction, they try to significantly improve 
their social credibility to acquire investments. 
Now we build hypotheses about the lender’s perspective: whether a borrower’s increased financial and 
social credibility has an effect on the decision making of the lender. The two hypotheses above focus 
on the borrowers’ efforts to increase their credibility after they failed to receive investments. However, 
it is another issue whether these increases in the borrower’s status have actually any effect on lenders’ 
loan decisions. According to the previous research, these two types of information, financial and social 
credibility, give positive impact on the loan decision. However, previous studies did not consider the 
context where borrowers retry initially failed loan auctions. Therefore our research suggests the 
following two hypotheses in perspective of the lender-side decision making. These two hypotheses 
identify which type of credibility affects the lenders decision making progress when borrowers retry 
their initially failed auctions: 
H2-1: When borrowers repost an initially failed P2P lending auction, the increase in these borrowers’ 
financial credibility has a positive impact on lenders’ loan decisions. 
H2-2: When borrowers repost an initially failed P2P lending auction, the increase in these borrowers’ 
social credibility has a positive impact on lenders’ loan decisions. 
3.4 Proposed Methodology 
We did not choose the model for testing our hypotheses, but we conducted two empirical tests to 
confirm that the presence of borrowers’ information renewal and its impact on lenders’ decision 
making. According to the previous section, H1-1 and H1-2 are related to increases in borrowers’ 
financial and social credibility respectively. On the other hand, H2-1 and H2-2 examine the change in 
lenders’ decision making. For the borrowers’ perspective, we used discriminant analysis to classify 
P2P loan auctions by the number of retrials. For the lenders’ perspective, we used logistic regression. 
In this test, we define the changes in borrowers’ credibility (both financial and social) after they failed 
their initial P2P loan auctions as dependent variables. Using these dependent variables, the logistic 
regression examines the impact of the changes in borrowers’ credibility on lenders’ decisions.  
We collected the log data of Popfunding.com from May 28, 2007 to July 31, 2010. Popfunding.com is 
the largest P2P lending site in Korea. During this period, there were a total of 5,807 auctions posted on 
the site. For our analysis, we excluded auctions that failed and were never posted again. As a result, a 
total of 1,883 auctions remained. From the log data of these 1,883 auctions, we extracted information 
about borrowers who posted auctions, and the results of other members’ prediction polls about these 
auctions. The data includes the investment result which means whether a borrower gets full investment 
or not, and the state of repayment for each auction. 
Due to the lack of space, we are not able to minutely describe the variables, the models, and the results. 
However, we could get the results which significantly support the hypotheses.  In this research in 
progress, we only present the descriptive statistics in Table 1 because of the page limit. 
 
 1
st
-
poseted 
auctions 
2
nd
- 
posted 
auctions 
3
rd
-
posted 
auctions 
More 
than 4
th
  
Number of auctions 855 733 222 73 
Number of certifications which are submitted by the borrower 2.07 2.24 2.41 2.32 
Amount a borrower has invested into other auctions 5,468 5,842 12,901 10,123 
Number of investments a borrower has done to other users 0.88 1.28 2.32 1.93 
Number of articles posted in the Q&A board 5.72 36.9 34.1 28.8 
Interval (days) - 23.1 31.1 28.9 
Requested amount (1,000 won) 1,932 2,055 1,971 1,815 
Requested duration (months) 13.7 14 14 13.3 
Maximum interest rate (%) 29.2 29.2 29.5 29.6 
Loan success (%) 13.8 19.1 25.2 32.9 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
3.5 Plans for Completion 
To complete this essay, we are trying to find more appropriate models for the empirical test. The 
online P2P lending market, especially in Korea, is considered a kind of the lemon market. Studying 
the previous research about the lemon market, we would collect more data from Popfunding, to 
intensify the theoretical background, and empirically investigate the change of borrowers’ and lenders’ 
behavior in P2P lending. If we find the factors that influence the learning mechanism in the market, it 
could be used to help this lemon market operate well and be sustainable. We plan to complete this 
essay by this summer.  
4 DYNAMICS OF PRICE ELASTICITY OVER TIME: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE E-BOOK INDUSTRY
2
 
The e-book market has been rapidly growing in recent years due to developments in technology and 
the widespread use of mobile devices such as smart phones and tablet PCs. Although an e-book serves 
as a nearly perfect substitute for its corresponding paper book in respect of content, it has many 
differences in regard to cost structure and consumer’s acceptance. Therefore, setting an appropriate 
price for an e-book is an academically interesting and practically important issue. Consumer price 
sensitivity and its dynamics should be investigated to develop an optimal pricing strategy.  
This essay empirically explores the dynamics of price elasticity of e-book demand. We use a data set 
that contains information for records of e-book sales for the last two years provided by Kyobobook, 
the largest book retailer in Korea. The results suggest that the demand for e-books is becoming price 
inelastic over time. This can be partially attributed to the reference price, which has been constructed 
by consumers through personal experiences. We also found other factors that influence the price 
                                              
2 This essay was submitted to PACIS 2013 as a completion paper.  
elasticity and demand of e-books. From the results, we discuss the broader implications on pricing 
strategy. 
5 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we show 3 essays: 
 Herding behavior in online P2P lending: An empirical investigation  
 Does borrowers’ information renewal change lenders’ decision in P2P lending? An empirical 
investigation  
 Dynamics of price elasticity over time: Evidence from the e-book industry 
We explore the impact of an online platform on human behavior and human perception, and 
empirically find that lenders in the P2P lending market tend to herd, and customers in the e-book 
market have been transforming their price sensitivity. We did not explain the details in this paper due 
to the page limit, but the first and third essay was completed even though we have a plan to develop 
third essay. The first essay can be available by searching online or the journal, ECRA, and the third 
one is under review in PACIS 2013. Therefore, we mainly represent the current stage of the second 
one in this paper. For this working essay, we build research hypotheses and confirm them by simple 
statistical methodology. We are still trying to study the previous research related with our second 
essay, and develop more appropriate empirical model. 
By completing and developing these essays, we expect that they will contribute to understanding 
online business and gain insights about online platforms.  
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